Thursday, May 26, 2011

The big Red Button

DOM Sicherheitstechnik has been around since 1936, that is to say they existed before WWII, one may even argue that the choice to use a “Dual Key” authentication mechanism was a result of their design; since they were the first Lock company to design a key that had two half and was increasingly difficult if not impossible to pick. [DOM]i In any military action where dual controls were needed, DOM keys were probably used up until a better option became available. In addition to the dual controls all encrypted messages would have been executed according to a protocol in a per-established manner.

A PAL is a complicated firring mechanism usually for a nuclear weapon; Weapons control is the core business of any military; as once stated all wars are 99% logistics and 1% destruction. Therefore a PAL's main goal is authentication, and enforcement of the chain of command in a given military to control a sensitive munition during it's logistical operations and execution in theater, including it's psychical characteristics and environmental awareness.[BSM]ii

This is really to ensure that should the big red button ever get pushed, the bomb knows who pushed it where and when and that is is to go off over what target. And this control must exist for all weapons, be they in an ICBM, on a submarine, on an Aircraft be it a bomber or multi-role fighter equipped with a nuclear weapon.

Recently 50 ICBM's at the 90th missile wing at the F.E. Warren Air Force base in Wyoming went off line, that is to say due to a network communications issue the PAL's went into a locked down mode titled LF-Down assuming that the base itself may have been vaporized. Realistically they simply lost communications with their command and control computers however simply losing this control is seen as an incident of note as it has never happened in known history to more than a few devices at once.[AM]iii The root cause was suspected communications cable issues; seeing as they are buried underground, ground water can casue corrosion; corrosion wreaks havok on the RFI and reflective RF properties of signals on a line.

This really underlies the importance of security control systems in general, PAL's are an electro mechanical control that may or may not include software. These would be refereed to within the realm of the (ISC)2 as a “Technical Control”they also have “Procedural Controls” and “Physical controls” to further secure their environment eixisting within the PAL or the procedure used to Arm it. [THF]iv

The Hanan incident in which a U.S. Signals intelligence plane was detained by Chinese authorities after an emergency landing has demonstrated that failure to physically destroy equipment will ensure that any capable opponent will reverse engineer every aspect of it. The NSA believed that their proprietary Operating System was secure in it's methods; surely if the NSA could have their greatest asset compromised by a team of Chinese engineers in less than 7 years; a nuclear weapon may only take 10 years.[HMS]v Although the advent of inexpensive solid state based storage will ensure that this never happens again as once chips are burnt, they are not forensically recoverable.

Just like any mechanism or device the PAL is most likely designed by a consortium of companies within the united states, we may assume that Lockheed Martin, Grumman, Bae Systems, Hughes and RSA have been involved since most of their primary business is military and federal consulting in aerospace. The greatest threat to any business involved in this area is espionage or the “Advanced Persistent Threat”; Agents may manipulate those in the employ of such companies like Gregg Bergersen to disclose the secrets any PAL they may have worked on for bribesvi.

In fact with the American economy in it's current state the threat of espionage is far greater then the very difficult threat of an enemy agent obtaining a weapon and reverse engineering it's PAL.

Tamper proof systems are subject to the same scrutiny as cryptographic methods. That is to say that a “Tamper proof box” may be designed to fail in a specific manner including a small explosion if exposed to light, heat or various forms of ionizing radiation including but not limited to PET or X-ray's. These systems are quite costly since the additional engineering also lends it self to reducing the overall reliability of said system by intentionally increasing it's complexity. Tamper proffing any complex system is costly and increases the testing and development costs of said system exponentialy, in the commercial communcations sector power supplies, signals boards and even chips are tamper proofed by encasing them in lead paint, removing markings and placing expoxy over any critical components of a given circuit. If the cirucut utilizes an RF housing this may be achieved by simply putting globs of epoxy over the desired components to prevent manipulation and visibility of said components.

There's even a large industry within the united stated devoted to the reverse engineering of said tamper proof systems. It's a matter of Competitive intelligence.

NTI states that the overall cost of the American nuclear program from 1940 to 1996 is around 5.8 trillion dollars. We may assume a good portion of that was in the development of PAL systems for warheads, as we can see they are neither cheap nor elegant but they must be a necessity to ensure the safety and operation of the current arsenal.a
iN.A. (Dom Security, 2011) About DOM [Online] World Wide Web, Available from: http://www.dom-sicherheitstechnik.com/Company.736.0.html (accessed on May 26th 2011)
iiBellovin, Steven M. (Coloumbia Unviersity, 02 September 2009) Permsissive Action Links [Online] World Wide Web, Available from: https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html (Accessed on May 26th 2011)
iiiAmbinder, Marc (The Atlantic, October 26 2010) Failure Shuts down Squadron of Nuclear Missle [Online] World Wide Web, Available from: http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/10/10/power-failure-shuts-down-sqaudron-of-icbms/65207 (Accessed on May 26th 2011)
ivTipton, Harold F. (Taylor and Francis, 2010) Offical (ISC)2 Guide to the CISSP CBK 2nd ed P. 47 ISBN: 978-1-4398-0959-4
vHersch, Seymor M (The New Yorker, November 1st 2010) The online Threat [Online] World Wide Web, Available from: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/11/01/101101fa_fact_hersh (Accessed on May 26th 2011)
viShuster (60 Minutes, February 28th 2010) Caught on Tape; Selling Americas secrets [Online] World Wide Web, Available From: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/02/25/60minutes/main6242498.shtml (Accessed on May 26th 2011)

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